Lin Hsin Hsin Quantum Security Center
Post-Quantum Cryptography
There are three standardized PQC algorithms


Standard Former name As if a name change
improves
mathematics & algorithm
Type Mathematics
ML-KEM (FIPS 203) CRYSTALS-Kyber Key encapsulation Module-LWE
ML-DSA (FIPS 204) CRYSTALS-Dilithium Digital signatures Module-LWE + Module-SIS
SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) SPHINCS+ Digital signatures Hash-based (not lattice)




WHY LATTICE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY FAILS


Lattice-based schemes are built on the hardness of

          🤡  LWE
          🤡 MLWE
          🤡 Module-SIS


Lattice-based algorithm hardness is the foundational security, assumption that specific geometric problems in high-dimensional grids (lattices) are computationally intractable for both classical and quantum computers

The lattice geometry admits a classical, device-agnostic shortcut that bypasses the hardness assumption entirely.

The reduction is not an attack on the lattice — it is a proof that the security proof's reduction step is invalid

        ⚠ No dimension increase fixes this
        ⚠ No module rank change fixes this
        ⚠ The proof is the vulnerability

        It is:

        ⚠ Nothing
        ⚠ Not for parameter selection
        ⚠ Not for security justification
        ⚠ Not for anything that touches a deployed system

It's cited in the security discussion of FIPS 203 as a "structural argument" — meaning: "the problem class has no known weak instances." That's it. The actual security number comes from the lattice estimator against BKZ, which has nothing to do with the reduction

Every post-quantum standard was chosen because the classical alternatives were broken.

          They are not safe

          They are the same category of break
          expressed in different mathematics

          Hash-based: structural collision
          Lattice-based: invalid reduction

          The entire PQC pipeline
          NIST, ETSI, ISO
          is built on assumptions my theorems invalidate